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TTIP – Opportunities and Risks 
for Developing Countries 
Contributions in International Journals and Think Tank Publications 2013–2014 
Evita Schmieg 
Since 2013 the European Union and the United States have been negotiating a Trans-
atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Such a deal would create the world’s 
largest free market and impact significantly on developing countries and the world 
trade system. Numerous authors discuss the expected effects, with strongly diverging 
assumptions leading to very different findings. Supporters of TTIP hope for significant 
prosperity gains, opponents fear grave disruptions in labour markets and the world 
economy. Overall, there is great concern about negative net effects on third countries 
not involved in the talks. 
 
As well as trade in goods, TTIP sets out to 
liberalise the service sector, create a posi-
tive climate for investment, and further 
open public procurement markets. During 
the past two years the planned agreement 
has triggered lively discussions and criti-
cism. A number of published studies on 
TTIP work with strictly economic assump-
tions and econometric models. They pro-
duce concrete, quantified results that are 
valid only under the assumptions of the 
model in question. As a rule it is presup-
posed that the goals of the talks (such as 
abolishing all customs duties) will actually 
be achieved. The potential benefits of the 
agreement consequently tend to be over-
estimated. 
Most of the contributions, however, steer 
away from a strict analytical framework. In 
some cases this is a deliberate choice, driven 
by a certain scepticism as to whether the 
formulated assumptions can actually pro-
duce viable pointers to real outcomes. These 
should be understood as political contribu-
tions, although depending on their stand-
point they are sometimes also based on 
restrictive and in some cases even contra-
dictory assumptions. 
Trade and Social Welfare Effects 
in Third Countries 
If TTIP comes into effect, the European 
Commission forecasts considerable addi-
tional growth for the European Union 
(€119 billion/year) and the United States 
(€95 billion/year). The trade volume of third 
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countries would also increase, and their 
GDP could rise by almost €100 billion. So 
even countries not involved in the talks 
would profit from TTIP. In a study for the 
German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Affairs (Felbermayr et al.), Ifo-Institut pre-
dicts a long-term increase in global prosper-
ity of 3.3 percent. Another study (Felber-
mayr, Heid and Lehwald) for Bertelsmann 
Stiftung considers two scenarios: firstly, 
liberalisation of all customs duties, and 
secondly an even deeper liberalisation en-
compassing a simplification of rules and 
standards and other steps. Although the au-
thors find worldwide gains in the first sce-
nario, the results vary widely between coun-
tries. Reciprocal tariff liberalisation by the 
United States and European Union (in other 
words, granting trade preferences within 
the planned free trade area) would toughen 
competition for third countries in the 
EU/US market where they remain subject 
to the usual tariffs. For this reason the big 
losers of a dismantling of tariffs are devel-
oping countries – in particular Ivory Coast 
and Guinea, but also Uganda, Tanzania and 
others – which would experience dramatic 
losses of market shares as their exports to 
Europe were displaced by competition from 
the United States. But there would also be 
winners profiting from indirect effects, 
such as Brazil, Kazakhstan and Indonesia. 
In the second scenario (deep liberalisation 
through TTIP), large aggregated gains would 
be expected, with mean global per capita 
income increasing by 3.27 percent. Losses 
in third countries would be distributed 
differently than in the first scenario: Tradi-
tional US trading partners such as Mexico, 
Canada, Chile, Australia, Japan and Israel 
would be the main losers. That, however, is 
based on the (unrealistic ceteris paribus) 
assumption that standards and regulations 
in the affected countries are not adapted to 
the new circumstances in the EU/US mar-
ket. As a result the negative effects are prob-
ably overestimated. 
In a study for the British Department for 
International Development, Rollo et al. in-
vestigate the effects of TTIP on low-income 
countries (in other words a much smaller 
group than those analysed in the aforemen-
tioned studies). Although they point to the 
problem of erosion of trade preferences for 
certain countries and products (fish, bana-
nas, sugar), they argue that the overall dan-
ger of export losses is small for this group, 
because the European Union and the United 
States are already unable to compete with 
them in the areas where the highest tariffs 
apply (textiles, clothing, shoes). Although 
there would be a theoretical risk of trade 
diversion for Bangladesh, Pakistan and 
Cambodia, the authors assert that such ef-
fects are not to be expected. The reason for 
this finding might be that, given the sectors 
involved, the poorest countries are not com-
peting directly with the European Union in 
the United States or vice versa. Even within 
the textile and clothing sectors, Bangladesh 
and the United States serve different seg-
ments of the European market. Rollo et al. 
foresee no grave consequences even for 
smaller low-income countries, because 
their exports to the European Union and 
the United States are dominated by raw 
materials or products with low customs 
duties, which would not be affected at all 
by TTIP. 
Effects in the Field of Standards 
Technical, sanitary and phytosanitary 
standards are an important aspect of the 
planned agreement. When it comes to the 
effects of the mutual recognition or har-
monisation of standards sought under TTIP, 
opinions diverge in some cases. According 
to certain studies (Rollo et al., Bertelsmann 
Stiftung, Freytag et al., Berger et al.) this 
field contains great potential for simplifica-
tion and cost-saving that would benefit all 
countries. The reciprocal recognition of 
rules by European Union and United States 
could also be open to third countries. Their 
exports to these important markets would 
then only have to fulfil the standards of one 
market and they would no longer have to 
deal with different standards in the Euro-
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pean Union and the United States. The 
same applies to harmonisation of stand-
ards, although these would initially incur 
adjustment costs because existing EU and 
US standards would have to be modified 
(Rollo et al.). In this connection Freytag 
et al. point to the centrality of conformity 
assessment systems which, they say, are 
necessary in order to profit from the advan-
tages that arise. For conformity assessment, 
a recognised institution must confirm that 
the product in question meets the set crite-
ria. This faces developing countries with 
great challenges, because they generally 
possess a less developed quality infrastruc-
ture and often lack such recognised institu-
tions. Rollo et al. also mention the difficul-
ties developing countries would find them-
selves exposed to if sanitary and phyto-
sanitary standards were tightened in the 
course of a harmonisation between Euro-
pean Union and United States. This, they 
say, would affect numerous African coun-
tries including Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Bur-
kina Faso and Burundi. 
Falk and Unmüßig apply the opposite 
assumption in their contribution for Hein-
rich-Böll-Stiftung – namely, that TTIP would 
lower rather than raise standards – and con-
clude that this would ease market access 
for developing countries. But the Green 
Party’s principled goal of raising standards 
would, they argue, have to be pursued at 
the multilateral level. Jäcklein in tageszeitung 
also emphasises the danger of TTIP water-
ing down standards and fears that the EU 
will abandon its “precautionary principle” 
in favour of the legal remedies favoured in 
the United States. A press release from Attac 
speculates that “chlorinated chickens”, 
hormone-fed pigs and GM maize could over-
run the European market. Finally, Wallach 
(also in tageszeitung) points out that con-
cerns about unsafe and unhealthy products 
flooding the domestic market exist in the 
United States too, in particular in relation 
to drug safety and toys (from the European 
Union). America fears the imported “salmo-
nella chicken” just as much as Europe loses 
sleep over the “chlorinated chicken”. 
Effects on the Multilateral System 
There are also contradictory views about 
the effects of TTIP on the multilateral sys-
tem. As well as the aforementioned addi-
tional growth, Felbermayr et al. emphasise 
that less regulation is normally positive, 
also for the international system. But sub-
stantial gains in prosperity are, they say, 
only possible if trade barriers are disman-
tled – and that is inconceivable within the 
WTO framework. The multilateral approach 
is, they argue, therefore no alternative to a 
deep regional agreement – and this could 
actually benefit third countries. There is 
something to be said for this theory: recip-
rocal recognition and harmonisation of 
standards also ease market access for third 
countries. Simplified customs procedures 
and border controls (trade facilitation) also 
directly benefit exporters from other coun-
tries. The simplification of provisions re-
lating to export of services (such as visa 
rules) can also be extended unproblemati-
cally to third countries, while improved 
transparency in public procurement bene-
fits all bidders. The relative importance of 
the trade-restricting effects of such rules 
and standards has increased strongly in 
recent decades as customs duties have fall-
en globally. The chances that a free trade 
agreement addressing non-tariff trade bar-
riers will benefit all have therefore risen. 
Freytag et al. supply another argument 
why the conclusion of “mega-regionals” like 
TTIP should have advantageous effects on 
the world economy: partners not affected 
by the agreement are generally strongly 
integrated into international value chains. 
That means, they argue, that tariff reduc-
tion in a free trade area like TTIP no longer 
necessarily discriminates against third 
countries, because products exported from 
the European Union to the United States 
or vice versa also contain generally a high 
share of value from third countries. 
Others suspect that TTIP will cause great 
harm to the world economic system. Falk 
and Unmüßig interpret the agreement 
(together with the TPPA) as an attempt to 
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establish a new world economic order un-
der EU and US tutelage, and argue that lack 
of influence on TTIP pressurises emerging 
economies to step up their multilateral en-
gagement. Dieter (Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik) contests the assumption that 
TTIP could advance global rule-making on 
the grounds that the Chinese government 
will not accept rules from whose formula-
tion it has been excluded. The assumption 
itself is unconvincing, he argues, because it 
ignores Beijing’s growing weight and con-
fidence. 
Hermisson (Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung) for-
mulates the central question as: “Do we 
want to join in actively shaping globalisa-
tion – or withdraw into national or region-
al spaces?” He concludes: “Isolationism in 
Europe is not only an economic illusion, 
but a politically dangerous undertaking.” 
Green Party demands, he believes, should 
not be restricted to simply stopping TTIP. 
Freytag et al. point out that TTIP could 
potentially lead to diversion of investment, 
with investors outside the free trade area 
gaining an incentive to invest within it in 
order to avoid the tariffs of the expanded 
transatlantic market. Such a diversion 
could, they argue, also reduce the flow of 
investment to developing countries. 
There is disagreement over the question 
of who might benefit most from TTIP. Fel-
bermayr et al. argue that reducing non-
tariff trade barriers would be most helpful 
to smaller and middle-sized businesses, 
whereas the biggest firms – which already 
export to the United States – would remain 
largely unaffected. The World Develop-
ment Movement, on the other hand, asserts 
that TTIP is about multinational corpora-
tions exploiting a global trade and invest-
ment framework to further expand their 
power. The predicted benefits for the world 
economy are exaggerated, it says, and even 
where they arose they would not benefit 
ordinary people. 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
The main object of criticism is investor-
state dispute settlement (ISDS). As Bréville 
and Bulard explain in tageszeitung, more 
than three thousand bilateral and free 
trade area agreements worldwide protect 
foreign companies from the consequences 
of state decisions (in the form of laws, regu-
lations and norms) that could impair their 
investment. Here the last word is not with 
national regulators and local courts, but 
supranational arbitration courts that to 
date, the authors assert, have mainly penal-
ised countries in the Global South. Three of 
the four complaints heard before the Inter-
national Centre for Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes (ICSID) were lodged by the 
United States and the European Union. 
“Of the 244 cases decided by the end of 
2012, 42 percent ended with a win for the 
state, 31 percent with a win for the investor 
and 27 percent with a compromise,” report 
Bréville and Bulard. Most of the lawyers 
and arbitrators involved in investor-state 
dispute settlement, they say, come from a 
group of about twenty (mostly US-based) 
law firms. But their examples demonstrate 
that today complaints may also be lodged 
against the governments of industrialised 
countries – Vattenfall v. Federal Republic of 
Germany over the nuclear shutdown being 
a case in point. 
The most problematic aspect of ISDS is 
that different rules apply to domestic and 
foreign investors (Langhammer, Verbrau-
cherzentrale Bundesverband, Eberhardt), 
as it permits foreign businesses to take the 
German government to the court of arbitra-
tion, while domestic businesses are obliged 
follow German legal channels. Langham-
mer underlines the importance of reform-
ing investment protection agreements such 
that supranational arbitration courts can 
only be called where foreign investors are 
recognisably disadvantaged vis-à-vis domes-
tic counterparts. Verbraucherzentrale Bun-
desverband also criticises this “reverse dis-
crimination” and calls for the investment 
protection chapter to be dropped from TTIP. 
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Eberhardt is not alone in warning that 
ISDS narrows the policy space of democrat-
ically elected governments. Attac demands 
that banks and corporations be given no 
new rights to take states to private arbitra-
tion courts, in order to prevent them sub-
verting democratic political decisions. 
The fact that most complaints to date 
have been lodged by corporations from the 
United States and the European Union sup-
ports the suspicion of critics that the trans-
atlantic free trade agreement is now sup-
posed to cement this system firmly into 
place as the global model. This supposition 
gains credence from a statement by EU 
Trade Commissioner De Gucht in Berlin 
(as reported by Greive in the Welt) that it 
would be problematic to omit the invest-
ment protection clauses from TTIP because 
that would complicate other trade talks, 
for example with China. 
The period of public consultation grant-
ed by the European Commission in the 
spring opened the possibility to introduce 
positions on investor-state dispute settle-
ment into the European discussion process. 
Hopefully the passionate debates of recent 
months will enhance transparency and aid 
substantive clarification. Bundesverband 
der Deutschen Industrie (BDI), which 
argues for robust investment protection, 
nonetheless wishes to use the TTIP talks to 
push for reforms: protection of the govern-
ment’s right to regulate, greater transpar-
ency in ISDS cases, narrow definition of 
central terms like “indirect expropriation”, 
establishment of an appeals procedure, and 
protection from inadmissible complaints. 
That way, the BDI argues, TTIP could be-
come the “gold standard” for other invest-
ment protection agreements. To Eberhardt, 
on the other hand, these would represent 
only minor modifications to the existing 
mechanism and would be unsuited to ad-
dressing the central problems. She argues 
for future investment protection agree-
ments to do without arbitration systems. 
Also, she argues, agreements must place 
binding social and ecological obligations 
on investors. 
The Economist (10 October 2014), also 
argues that reform should go further. It 
cites the World Trade Organisation, where 
only states can bring complaints, as a good 
example, because firms must first convince 
their governments that trade rules have 
been breached. The proceedings are run 
like trials, open to public scrutiny, and sub-
ject to appeal. The Economist concludes 
“Firms need protection; but so does the 
right of governments to pursue reasonable 
policies.” 
Bréville and Bulard point out that as it 
stands presently, only developing countries 
are affected by any negative consequences 
of investment protection, such as demands 
for compensation and the associated ero-
sion of government power to enforce social, 
ecological and consumer protection rules. 
If TTIP is signed, however, European govern-
ments and the US Administration would 
also have to fear action: another reason 
why the proposals for the TTIP investment 
chapter are likely to be intensely scruti-
nised and in certain aspects – in compari-
son to existing agreements – revised. The 
heated discussion over the TTIP investment 
chapter and a possible agreement between 
European Union und United States on re-
vised and additional formulations could 
also lead to stronger questioning of provi-
sions in existing investment protection 
agreements with developing countries. 
Recommendations for 
Developing Countries 
How can developing countries ensure that 
they derive the greatest possible benefit 
from the emergent transatlantic agree-
ment? Felbermayr, Heid and Lehwald em-
phasise that if a comprehensive agreement 
is concluded, additional economic growth 
in the European Union and the United 
States will generate enough wealth to com-
pensate any losers. At the same time they 
hope that TTIP will inject new momentum 
into the WTO trade talks and increase the 
willingness of developing countries and 
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emerging economies to make concessions 
in the Doha Development Round. The idea 
is that these countries will be interested in 
global liberalisation to ameliorate the nega-
tive consequences of TTIP. According to the 
Felbermayr, Heid and Lehwald the indus-
trialised countries should also be willing to 
compromise (at the multilateral level) be-
cause a major deepening of economic rela-
tions between the United States and the EU 
would generate the required resources. Ad-
justment processes required by global liber-
alisation would then be easier to finance. 
Rollo et al. recommend that low-income 
countries demand compensation for possi-
ble losses, backed up by the following mea-
sures: 1) expansion of non-reciprocal trade 
preferences (this would largely affect the 
United States because the EU already grants 
free market access to the least developed 
countries); 2) exclusion of their most im-
portant products from TTIP; 3) reciprocal 
recognition for third countries on sanitary 
and phytosanitary standards; and 4) sup-
port for adaptation to higher standards 
through development cooperation. They 
also advise these countries, 5) to improve 
the competitiveness and flexibility of their 
own economies in order to cope better with 
externally-driven change. As such, they un-
derline the importance of internal reforms 
and “good governance”. The developing 
countries could also direct their energies 
towards a success of the multilateral trade 
talks, which would bring, Rollo et al. argue, 
greater long-term benefit than lobbying for 
compensation of the side-effects of TTIP. 
In order to better assess the effects of 
TTIP on developing countries, more coun-
try-level analyses at would be useful. These 
could operate using more concrete assump-
tions, such as which specific customs duties 
would probably be included in a TTIP liber-
alisation and how this might affect the 
competitive situation of a country’s export 
products in the EU/US market. They could 
also investigate which technical, sanitary 
and phytosanitary standards affect the ex-
port products of a particular developing 
country in the TTIP market and to what ex-
tent that country’s quality infrastructure 
would be in a position to respond to chang-
es in these standards. Only on the basis of 
such country analyses will developing coun-
tries be able to draw specific conclusions 
for their own positioning and preventive 
policy. 
The effects of TTIP on developing coun-
tries will depend on what is actually agreed 
between European Union und United States. 
The difficult start to the negotiations sug-
gests that there is unlikely to be a sweeping 
abolition of tariffs between the EU and the 
United States, and the two sides are far 
apart on many aspects of standards. To that 
extent the assumptions of the discussed 
studies are unrealistic and the findings of 
their calculations overoptimistic – not to 
mention that the original schedule for com-
pleting the talks by 2015 appears utopian. 
This also corresponds with the assessment 
of the former EU Trade Commissioner, now 
WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy, who 
said that the opponents of TTIP could sleep 
soundly because it would be many years be-
fore it was concluded. One might add that 
the agitation is overblown anyway, because 
the outcome of the talks will lie somewhere 
in the middle and the real-world effects will 
certainly remain moderate. Nonetheless, 
the studies examined here contain mean-
ingful pointers to possible consequences 
of an agreement and direct attention to 
areas where TTIP could have critical conse-
quences for individual countries. 
Nor will the often overstated assump-
tions of the more political contributions 
turn out true. But they do reveal concerns 
associated with the agreement, above all in 
civil society, cast a light on aspects that give 
grounds for deeper investigation, and sup-
ply negotiators with important ideas for 
their positioning as the negotiations pro-
gress. The current public discussion could 
bring the results closer to societal prefer-
ences than is usual in cases with less strong 
public interest. The debate could also con-
tribute to particular arguments being 
weighed very carefully. In all likelihood this 
will improve the quality of the outcome. 
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